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AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY: LARSEN v. GENERAL
MOTORS AND ITS AFTERMATH
Ever since the highly publicized writings of Ralph Nader in 1965
and the subsequent Congressional hearings in 1966, the issue of automobile safety has been a national concern. In the midst of this
attention, a great deal of consideration has focused upon "second accident" injuries which occur when a victim is thrown against the interior
of the passenger compartment after his vehicle has first collided with an
external object.' These injuries often result from faulty automobile
design.2 While automobile manufacturers have been held liable for
3
negligent construction which causes "first" accidents, they have, until
quite recently, avoided liability when the alleged defect was the automobile design.4
Those courts which do find a cause of action for faulty automobile
design rely on traditional negligence principles. While plaintiffs have
often asserted the developing theories of strict liability and implied
warranty as alternative grounds for recovery, negligence claims have
3
This reliance on negligence
been the focal point of decisions.
principles may be an example of a judicial propensity to depend on
An auto manufacturer's publication aptly describes the second collision:
What happens to the passengers inside the car? "A body in motion will
continue in a straight line until something stops it." The passengers continue
to move at the braking speed of 30 mph at impact until they are stopped by
the instrument panel, the header bar or the steering wheel, or possibly the
pavement via an open door. This is the so-called second accident which
actually produces the injuries.
1

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, WHrAT HAPPENED TO THE APPLE,

cited in Katz, Liability of

Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HAgv. L. REv.
863, 868 (1956).
2 See R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE
AmEmcAN AUTOMOBILE (1965); Auerbach, Defective Automobile Design-Tort
Action as a Means of Forcing Improvement, in TRAuMA AND THE AuTOMOBILE 35
(W. Curran & N. Chayet eds. 1966); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers
for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 863 (1956); Nader & Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REV. 645 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Nader & Page].
a g, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 Design defects are, by definition, common to all vehicles of a particular model.
Construction defects are generally limited to an extremely small portion of a
given model.
The earliest reported assertion of automobile design liability is Foster v. Ford
Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926). For later decisions dismissing
assertions of negligent automobile design, see, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp.,
384 F2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311
(S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967);
Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958).
Plaintiff
5 See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (1965).
alleged negligence in design, negligent failure to warn of a latent defect, strict liability
for defective manufacture of an inherently dangerous instrument, and breach of express
and implied warranties of merchantability. The Eighth Circuit ruled on the negligence
allegation, found contradictory indications in Michigan precedents imposing strict
liability, and never reached the warranty counts. For full discussion of Larsen, see
text accompanying notes 21-48 infra.
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familiar theories to achieve reform.' But it also avoids the privity
requirements of warranty actions' and skirts the unsettled question
whether an automobile is an inherently dangerous instrument, a prerequisite of strict liability in some states.'
Within the context of framing the negligence issue, courts have
generally considered the exercise of due care as both a question of law
in which the court must determine whether the manufacturer has a duty
to provide accident victims with reasonable protection from injury,9 and
a question of fact in which the jury must determine whether the duty
was breached.' 0 In determining the existence of a legal duty, the court
assesses the foreseeability of injury, the gravity of the possible injury,
and the cost of minimizing the risk of such injury." If these three
factors exist in the proper relationship, with the foreseeability of injury
great, the extent of possible injury severe,'" and the cost of minimizing
the risk relatively low,' 3 the court should find, as a matter of law, that
the manufacturer owes a duty to consumers to design "a reasonably
safe container within which to make the journey." 14
The courts, however, have occasionally lost sight of these basic
negligence principles when dealing with the question whether to impose
a duty of safe design on the automobile manufacturers; this has caused
considerable concern among commentators.'" The loss of perspective
has been prompted primarily by shrewd legal manipulation on the part
of the industry's counsel. These lawyers have managed to persuade the
courts that a plaintiff seeking recovery based on faulty design is in
effect contending that the manufacturer is under a duty to design and
construct a crashproof or foolproof car.' 6 One frequently cited example
6
See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HA~v. L. REv. 463
(1962).
*7See,

e.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961).

See

generally 1 R. HURscH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY §§ 6:58-6:63 (1960).

Privity is seldom an obstacle in actions for negligent design. See, e.g., Caprini v.
Pittsburg & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (bus manufacturer
liable to injured passengers for negligent design of brake system); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment i, at 330 (1965).
8 See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968).
9Id. at 498; see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 207 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
10 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1074 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
See PRossm, mspra note 9, at 208.
"1See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), discussed in 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 16.9, at 929 (1956).
12 In 1965, 49,000 persons died in automobile accidents, and 1.8 million were
injured. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1966). See O'Connell,
Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 348 (1963).
13 For example, the average estimated cost of head restraints, which are required
on models manufactured after January 1, 1969, is $11.95 at wholesale, and $16.66 at
retail. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, WHOLESALE PRICES &
PRICE INDEXES, Jan. 1969, at 2.
14 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
For a discussion of Dyson, see text accompanying notes 53-66 infra.
1See authorities at note 2 supra.
36See, e.g., Schumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311, 314 (S.D.

Ohio 1967).
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for the acceptance of this doctrine is the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Evans v. General Motors Corp.'7 In that case plaintiff alleged that
General Motors was negligent in designing the frame of its 1961
Chevrolet station wagon. The car was manufactured without the
perimeter frame rails which were being used in many other cars. The
complaint averred that because the X-type frame would not adequately
protect occupants during a side-impact collision, defendant had created
an unreasonable risk of serious injury."8 The Evans court responded
by stating that "[a] manufacturer is not under a duty to make his
automobile accident-proof or foolproof ..

. , 19 Thus, by exaggerat-

ing the complaint of the plaintiff, defendant's counsel convinced the
court to immunize the manufacturer from liability for an arguably
dangerous auto design. The court held as a matter of law that the
manufacturer's duty did not extend to the particular design precaution
which the plaintiff in that case deemed to be reasonable. °
The Eighth Circuit, however, was not deceived by the industry's
exaggerated view of the plaintiff's claims. In Larsen v. General Motors
Corp.,2 ' the steering column of the plaintiff's Corvair protruded beyond
the forward surface of the front tires. The plaintiff complained that the
rearward displacement of the steering shaft in a head-on collision was
much greater on the Corvair than on cars designed to protect against
such displacement. General Motors relied on the Evans "crashproof"
argument in order to rebut this contention. Whereas the Larsen court
agreed that it was beyond the state of the art to produce a crashworthy
car, they stated that such an argument was irrelevant. 2 The court was
concerned instead with the manufacturer's ability to foresee that many
of the cars which it produced would be involved in accidents, and
with whether it was possible to design vehicles which would not increase
the risk of serious injuries resulting from these accidents.23 The court,
after dismissing the "crashproof" concept and framing the issue as
stated above, concluded:
We perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experience, nor any command in precedent, why the manufacturer
should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design
of its vehicle consonant with the state of the art to minimize
the effect of accidents.2
17359 F2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
18

Id. at 824.

19Id.
20 Id. at 825. Evidence at trial demonstrated that defendant had previously used
a perimeter or "ladder" frame with side rails and that other models were advertised
as having safer frames. Berger, Automobile Safety Design Problems, in AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS AssocIATiON TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONvENTION 1966, at 705, 706
(1967). See Nader, Automobile Design Hazards, in 16 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
74-90 (1965).
21391 F2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'g 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967).
=Id. at 502.
231d. at 502-03.
24Id. at 503.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

302

[Vo1.118:299

A second tactic employed to prevent the imposition of a duty on
automobile manufacturers is the utilization of the doctrine of abnormal
use. This ploy relies on the well-established principle that a manufacturer's liability for negligence is restricted to situations where his
product is used "for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect
it to be used." ' The courts then are faced with the difficult decision
whether the unintentional misuse of an automobile is in fact so unintentional and unforeseeable that the case should be taken from the jury.
Again, the Evans court presents an excellent illustration of the judicial
acceptance of this argument. The court there held that the plaintiff had
failed to state a cause of action because the injury asserted was not
caused by the intended use of the automobile:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include
its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the
manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur.26
It should be noted that the "intended use and purpose" limitation on
manufacturer liability applies only to conscious utilization of the product
by the injured operator.2 7 However, few courts have recognized the
distinction between intentional and unintentional misuse; most have
insisted on following the Evans logic, thereby holding that the manufacturer has no duty to design his automobile in order to protect against
second accidents.2
The Larsen opinion offers a well-reasoned response to this argument. Larsen stated that because these accidents are foreseeable, the
manufacturer should protect against them.
While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of
normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury
producing impacts. . . . Where the injuries or enhanced
injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure to use reasonable care to avoid subjecting the user of its products to an
unreasonable risk of injury, general negligence principles
should be applicable. The sole function of an automobile is
not just to provide a means of transportation, it is to provide
a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably
possible under the present state of the art."
2

5 RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS
(SECOND)

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 395 (1965).

But see

RESTATEMENT

§ 395, comment k at 331 stating: "The manufacturer may, however, reasonably anticipate other uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily
intended."
26 359 F2d at 825.

Nader & Page 662.
See, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967);
Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v.
Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
29 391 F2d at 502.
27

28
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The court also pointed out the irony that while members of the industry
during Congressional hearings publicly acknowledged their responsibility to build safer cars, in the less public forum of the courtroom they
contended that they owed no legal duty to the public to design a
reasonably safe car.3"
Related to the question of the manufacturer's ability to foresee
second accident injuries are the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. Contributory negligence often constitutes a bar to
recovery for second accident injuries if the plaintiff was not in the
exercise of ordinary care at the time of the accident. But, as a matter
of sound policy, the plaintiff's contributory negligence should not absolve the manufacturer of a duty of safe design 1 nor immunize him
from all liability. The plaintiff's negligence precludes his recovery for
certain injuries, but should not absolve the manufacturer of liability for
injuries which are the direct result of his failure, in light of foreseeable
auto collisions, to exercise due care in compartmental design. Damages,
then, should be apportioned so that the manufacturer whose negligent
design actually produced the second accident injuries would be liable
only for the harm he caused.
While there is necessarily some element of risk involved in the
operation of any motor vehicle, it does not follow that the auto consumer
assumes risks which are the direct result of the manufacturer's faulty
design. Because the average driver does not understand the relationshould not be
ship between auto design and the potential for injury, he
32
held to have assumed risks of which he was unaware.
Judicial hesitancy to hold automobile manufacturers liable for
negligent design is attributable in part to misgivings about the jury's
judgment on the issues of damage apportionment and the expert's
standard of care. Where the negligent design did not cause the first
accident, but did contribute to the second accident injuries, damages
must be apportioned to limit the liability of the auto manufacturer to
the harm he actually caused. The difficulty in precisely apportioning
damages should not, however, absolve the manufacturer of all liability.
The court in Larsen resolved this problem, stating:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not
subject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but
the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the
sold. at 504 n.7.
31 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS

§ 395 (1965) suggests that an auto manu-

facturer owes a duty to avoid creating an unreasonable risk to the negligent driver.
An act of omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent

or reckless conduct of the other or a third person.

Comment b to § 395 warns, however, that while the original actor may have been negligent in failing to meet such a duty, the injured plaintiff may be precluded from

recovery by his own negligent conduct.
32 Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Desigi of Passenger
Cars, supra note 2, at 872.
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damage or injury caused by the defective design over and
above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred
as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.
The manufacturer argues that this is difficult to assess. This
is no persuasive answer and, even if difficult, there is no reason
to abandon the injured party to his dismal fate as a traffic
statistic, when the manufacturer owed, at least, a common law
duty of reasonable care in the design and construction of its
product. The obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable. It is done with regularity in those jurisdictions applying
comparative negligence statutes and in other factual situations
such as condemnation cases, where in some jurisdictions the
jury must assess the value of the land before and after a taking
and then assess a special benefit accruing to the remaining
property of the condemnee."3
This argument is convincing. The difficulty of apportionment, in this
instance, is an unpersuasive reason for taking cases from the jury. To
do so abandons the injured plaintiff without a critical evaluation of the
manufacturer's conduct.
Complementing the apportionment problem is the concern on the
part of the judiciary that juries are not appropriate arbiters of design
decisions made by engineering experts. However, this argument also
defies traditional legal theory. It is not a novel idea to require a jury
4
Two highway
to pass on the standard of care exercised by experts.
safety advocates have recently observed:
Perhaps the courts are willing to affix responsibility to individual experts, but have difficulty where the expert decision
is hallowed by a brand name and a corporate shield. The mere
technical nature of an issue does not justify its exemption from
the public judgment expressed by the judicial process. In
areas such as medical malpractice, juries often must resolve
questions of a complicated nature. In fact, the issues arising
in auto design design cases are often well within the grasp of
laymen. 35
33 Larsen
34

v. General Motors Corp., 391 F2d 495, 503 (1968).

See, e.g., Bayshore Development Co. v. Bondfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918)

(holding liability of architect for negligent design was an issue for the jury);
Tremblay v. Kimball, 107 Me. 53, 77 A. 405 (1910) (affirming jury verdict of
liability of pharmacist for negligent filling of a prescription) ; Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (holding liability of public accountants
for negligent auditing procedures was an issue for the jury) ; Guaranty Abstract Co.
v. Denman, 209 S.W2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (affirming jury verdict of liability
of professional abstracter for negligent drafting of chain of title) ; McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (holding liability of
school district for alleged failure adequately to supervise students' recess was an issue
for the jury).
35 Nader & Page 663.
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Another factor inhibiting a more aggressive attitude on the part
of the courts is the realization that a judgment for a particular plaintiff
may subject the defendant to other claims so numerous and costly as
to produce serious economic consequences for both the individual manufacturer and the industry as a whole.36 However, this argument falls
by an extension of its own logic. It implies that the greater the risk
created, the more desirable the immunity from liability.3" The cost
of calling back defective automobiles does not deter automobile manufacturers from assuming this responsibility for unsafe construction.
Therefore, it should not deter the courts from imposing liability when
actual harm has resulted from faulty design.
The final, and probably the most compelling, reason for refusing to
hold manufacturers liable for unsafe design was articulated by the
Evans court:
Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to
construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but
that would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial
interpretation of existing law. 38
This argument is now even more persuasive due to the passage of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966." 9 The
Act requires that the Secretary of Transportation promulgate safety
standards for the design of new models in order to protect the automobile consumer against unreasonable risk of accident or injury.
Standards have been developed since 1967 and have been incorporated
in recent models.40
There are several obvious advantages to legislative, rather than
judicial, establishment of minimum design standards. Independent research can give a regulatory body a better understanding of design
complexities than judges and juries are able to achieve through expert
testimony. Standards promulgated by an administrative body also provide a measure of uniformity and certainty with regard to future application. These qualities are difficult to achieve when individual courts
establish standards in the sporadic nature that the case-by-case approach
requires.
However, in practice, the standards developed by the Department
of Transportation have not provided a comprehensive approach to highway safety. Many commentators have complained that the Department
is still too much the captive of the industry and has not incorporated
S6 In 1967 Ralph Nader noted: "There is simply no data available from the
manufacturers from which to ascertain the financial impact which design suits have
made on the industry." Id. at 673.
37 Id. at 664.
38 359 F2d 822, 824 (1966).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. III, 1968).
40
For example, head restraints, seat belts, and side marker lamps.
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changes that have long been considered necessary.a The new standards
that are incorporated apply only to models produced after announcement,
and, in many instances, there is a substantial lag between the date of
promulgation and the date when they become mandatory.'4 In addition,
all vehicles manufactured before the development of these regulations
are unaffected by their promulgation.
Furthermore, it is clear that Congress did not intend the Department regulations to be all-inclusive. Section 108(c) of the Act specifies
that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard
issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law." 4 The report of the Senate Committee
on Commerce unequivocably sets forth the legislative intent not to preempt judicial development:
The Federal minimum safety standards need not be
interpreted as restricting State common law standard of care.
Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily
shield any person from product liability at common law."
Courts therefore should be free to determine what constitutes due care
with respect to design modifications not covered by the federal regulation. The Larsen court adopted such an approach by handling the
legislative preemption problem in the following manner:
It is apparent that the National Safety Act is intended to
be supplementary of and in addition to the common law of
negligence and product liability. The common law is not
sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of society by
adapting standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly
meet the emerging and developing needs of our time. The
common law standard of a duty to use reasonable care in light
of all the circumstances can at least serve the needs of our
society until the legislature imposes higher standards or the
courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The
Act is a salutory step in this45 direction and not an exemption
from common law liability.

It should also be noted that the automobile industry's engineers,
physicians, and statisticians are in an excellent position to develop practicable design modifications in order to protect manufacturers from
41 See, e.g., Anderson, Transportation Dept. Is Serving as Agent of the Auto
Industry, The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Aug. 20, 1969, at 96, col. 6; CONSUMER

REPORTS, April, 1969, at 182-83.
42 See, e.g., Campbell, Twelve Years of Automotive Crash Injury Research, in
TRAUMA AND THE AUTOMOBILE, 1 (W. Curran & N. Chayet eds. 1966). For a general
bibliography, see ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC
SAFETY 297-624 (1966).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (Supp. III, 1968).

For similar indications of
44 S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1966).
legislative intent in the House, see H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).

45 391 F.2d at 506.
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liability. Stimulated by MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.,46 automakers
have devised methods of production and inspection which have made
construction defects relatively rare.4 ' However, given the courts' predisposition not to hold manufacturers liable for negligent design, the
industry has had little incentive to make design modifications beyond
those specifically required by the Department.48
Considering the
industry's research capabilities, it would be an inefficient allocation of
testing resources to shift all design development to a single government
agency.
Larsen, then, stands as a landmark in automotive design liability,
refuting many of the shibboleths by which liability was previously
avoided. Two recent cases relying heavily on Larsen establish a trend
which may forecast a new judicial outlook towards the responsibility of
49
automobile manufacturers to design for safety. Mickle v. Blackmon,
decided in 1969 by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, was the first
of these cases. In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger in a 1949
Ford which collided with a second car. The impact of the collision
threw the plaintiff toward the vehicle's gear shift which protruded two
inches beyond the rim of the steering wheel. A small plastic knob
protected the end of the tapered lever that pointed toward the passenger
seat. The ultraviolet rays of sunlight had caused the plastic knob to
deteriorate, thereby destroying the force distributing quality of the
knob."' The protective ball shattered on contact with the plaintiff's
body, impaling her on the spear-like lever and causing permanent
paralysis of the lower torso. Plaintiff charged, inter alia, that the
design of the gearshift lever presented an unreasonable risk of injury
if not adequately guarded and that Ford had been negligent in its choice
of plastic for the protective knob. At trial, the jury brought in a verdict
against Ford for $312,000 actual damages. The trial court granted
Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the plaintiff appealed. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Ford's con46217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
47 Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, supra note 2, at 864.
48 There is evidence to suggest that while General Motors' counsel argued in
Evans that manufacturers had no duty to design automobiles to protect passengers
against side-impact, GM had by that time approved installation of side strengthening
rails in 1969 and 1970 models. Telephone conversation with Elwood S. Levy, Sept. 19,
1969. (Mr. Levy was plaintiff's counsel in Dyson.)
49252

S.C. 202, 166 S.E2d 173 (1969).

5o Ternite butyrate, the plastic material from which Ford made the hollow knob,
was available in a wide range of colors, including black. Ford chose to use white
tennite butyrate for the knobs in its 1949 model despite the fact that carbon, the
coloring agent used to produce black plastic, was highly resistant to ultraviolet rays.
Hairline cracks developed in the white balls, but black plastic Ford used in its 1950
and later models never developed these cracks. Ford admitted knowing in 1948 that
white plastic would soon deteriorate in sunlight, but disclaimed use of the ball as a
safety device. Id. at 234-36, 166 S.E.2d at 187-88.
The court found that the advanced age of the ball was coincidental to its failure
rather than the cause of it, and that the knob would have shattered much earlier
if subjected to a comparable impact.
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tention, which was primarily based on the Evans case, that it owed no
duty in the design and composition of its product to minimize the collision connected hazards caused by the design of the passenger compartment. The court said:
[A] n automobile manufacturer knows with certainty that
many users of his product will be involved in collisions, and
that the incidence and extent of the injury to them will frequently be determined by the placement, design and construction of such interior components as shafts, levers, knobs,
handles and others. By ordinary negligence standards, a
known risk of harm raises a duty of commensurate care. We
perceive no reason in logic or law why an automobile manufacturer should be exempt from this duty.5 '
The Mickle court, relying heavily on Larsen, refused to be misled
by defendant's counsel. A clear and reasonable formulation of the
issue was presented. On remand, jury instructions, premised on the
manufacturer's duty to take design precautions, will seek a determination
"whether the collision risk to which the [plaintiff] was subjected by
the design and composition of the gearshift lever assembly was
unreasonable."

2

The second case was decided by the District Court for the Eastern
3
District of Pennsylvania. In Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,5 the
plaintiff was a passenger in a 1965 Buick two door hardtop when the
vehicle left the road and rolled onto its roof. The roof collapsed under
the weight of the overturned car. Plaintiff conceded that the allegedly
defective roof design 4 did not cause the accident, but contended that
the severity of her injuries was greatly increased by the inability of the
roof to support, even partially, the weight of the vehicle. General
Motors, again relying primarily on the theory of the Evans case, argued
that it was under no duty to avoid the creation of unreasonable risk
of second collision injuries. The district court denied the manufacturer's motion for judgment on the pleadings,5 stating:
[I]t is the obligation of an automobile manufacturer to provide more than merely a movable platform capable of transrn

52

Id. at 230, 166 S.E.2d at 185.
Id. at 243, 166 S.E2d at 192.

-3298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).

54To create the 1965 Electra two door hardtop, Buick removed from its
sedan design the center door posts, reduced door frame specifications from full-frame
to half-frame, and changed the angle of the roof supports. All earlier Electras had
full frame doors and center posts. 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
55 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
Because defendant argued that since it had no duty
there could be no actionable negligence, the court's ruling established as a matter
of law defendant's duty of safe design and held for jury determination the question
whether defendant met this obligation. "Questions of law which are settled by the
decision of a motion for judgment on the pleadings cannot be raised again at a
later stage of the action." 1A W. BARu~oN & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCFDURE § 358, at 393 (Wright ed. 1960).
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porting passengers from one point to another. The passengers
must be provided with a reasonably safe container within
which to make the journey. The roof is part of such container, and . . . should provide more than merely protection

against the rain.56

Dyson, too, is indebted to Larsen for its rationale.
Aside from reaffirming the Larsen approach, Dyson and Mickle
also reinforce a view that courts have vital functions to perform in the
field of automobile safety. In both cases the courts were dealing with
automobiles produced before 1966, and whose safety standards were
therefore not prescribed by the 1966 Act. While many injuries may
be lessened by post-1965 legislation and administrative action, only
courts can grant redress for injuries aggravated by pre-1966 design
negligence. But beyond granting compensation for injuries, courts can
also supplement legislative or administrative action in setting safety
standards in another manner. Dyson, for example, involved a design
feature which the Department of Transportation could not have covered
at the time of production (because the year was pre-1966), and
did not cover thereafter.57 Without deciding whether or not the
Department should have established such standards, nevertheless it is
clear there was a need for them. Automotive safety experts have advocated stronger roof supports for many years." The Safety Administration Committee of the Automobile Manfacturer's Association had
even suggested that the Department promulgate "[r]equirements for
passenger compartment integrity during typical impact conditions, including rollover." " The applicability of established tort doctrine and
the demonstrated availability of feasible, safer alternatives provide all
that is needed for courts to participate concurrently with legislativeadministrative action in the fashioning of design standards.
However, a closer look at the language in Dyson uncovers an
ambiguity that may undercut the role courts can play in supplementing
the 1966 Act, as well as the whole approach sparked by the Eighth

Circuit in Larsen. The car in Dyson was a two door hardtop. Counsel
for General Motors argued that to hold defendants liable would amount
to a declaration that "soft-top" convertibles are unreasonable per se
since they are obviously not as safe as the sedan which has the added
support of the center posts.6° The court's attempt to answer this contention is ambiguous:
6O 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
67The Deparment has yet to require integrated roof supports on hardtop models
or to promulgate structural requirements for roof support columns, although standards for roof strength have been under consideration since 1967. See 32 Fed. Reg.

14281 (Oct. 14, 1967).

58 For example, the "Survival Car I," a prototype safety vehicle built jointly by
the Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. and Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory in 1957,
contained
integrated roll-over bars above the front and back seats.
59
Hearings on HR. 13228 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1966).
60 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
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[T]he manufacturer can be expected to provide a convertible
which is as safe as it reasonably can be made, and which is not
appreciably less safe than other convertibles. So, too, in the
present case, the manufacturer was not necessarily under an
obligation to provide a hardtop model which would be as
resistant to roll-over damage as a four door sedan; but the
defendant was required, in my view, to provide a hardtop
model which was a reasonably safe version of such model,
and which was not substantially less safe than other hardtop
models.6 '
One interpretation of this passage is that a determination on the part
of the court that General Motors's hardtop model was not substantially
less safe than Ford's or Chrysler's would exempt General Motors from
liability.
Not only does this interpretation substantially increase the burden
of proof upon the plaintiff, but it also contradicts language in Larsen
and Mickle. These cases do not suggest a comparative standard of
care based on prevailing practices within the automobile industry.
Rather, they apply an objective standard of reasonableness based on
design capabilities and economic practicalities. In order to build a
reasonably safe car, the manufacturer must take reasonable measures
not only to prevent accidents, but also to protect passengers when
accidents actually occur. Measures necessary to achieve this objective
must be adopted to the extent that they are reasonable, given the present
state of the art and their economic feasibility.
The problem with the industry standard which may be implied in
Dyson is that it presents the manufacturers with another semantic game
by which they can avoid due care in the design of their product. Instead
of encouraging manufacturers to develop new standards that are economically and technically feasible, this interpretation would only require
that they keep pace with the standards of the other manufacturers. The
possibility of a conspiratorial stand-still among the three primary
manufacturers could nullify any motivation that either the 1966 Act 62
or any concurrent thrust of the common law might be able to inspire.
In effect, if the comparative standard is adopted, the industry could
do away with ploys of overstating or misstating the negligence issue,
simply compare their design to that of other manufacturers, and be
comforted with the knowledge that they too are doing very little to
protect the automobile consumer.
Admittedly, the dilemma presented to the automobile industry is a
troubling one. Although it is tempting to suggest that automakers be
compelled to adopt only the highest safety standards, this might require
consumers to forego other values, such as style and economy. There
61 Id. at 1073-74 (emphasis added).
62This possible dampening effect is based on the alleged influence of the auto
industry on the Department of Transportation. Note 41 mspra & accompanying text.
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is, however, a plausible interpretation of the Dyson case that would
resolve the dilemma. The court might well be saying that each model
must be designed in order to make it as safe as the state of the art and
financial limitations permit. Thus, any language within the opinion
which indicates that a comparison with other models is necessary is, in
effect, only referring to such a comparison as inconclusive evidence of
a reasonable standard. Expert testimony could be used in order to
examine whether the entire industry was dragging its feet in a particular
design area.

3

Implicit in this latter interpretation of Dyson is the belief that the
consumer assumes the risks inherent in those models which are less
safe than the most crashworthy model. However, as mentioned earlier,
only the more sophisticated car buyer is able to relate design to some
degree of protection in collisions.' Therefore a requirement consistent
with such a reading should be that insofar as the model varies from
the safest car that the manufacturer produces, the consumer must be
forewarned."' For example, it should be pointed out to the potential
buyer of a two door hardtop that, due to certain stylistic modifications,
it is not as safe in a roll-over accident as the four door sedan. If the
consumer acknowledges this warning, and, in fact, the particular model
is as safe as could reasonably be expected, the consumer will be considered to have assumed the risks inherent in the model and the66 automobile manufacturer will be exempt from liability to that extent.
The use of an objective rather than a comparative standard for
each model and the issuance of a warning to the consumer that certain
models necessarily sacrifice certain safety standards to style or economy
would provide considerable protection for both the consumer and the
industry.
63

What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it is
usually complied with or not.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymen, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (Holmes, J.). See also
Learned Hand's statement in T. J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), that "a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices."
There is evidence to suggest that at the remanded trial of Larsen v. General
Motors Corp. the trial court charged the jury that the applicable standard of care was
either an industry set standard or a "community standard." Bowman, Defense of an
Auto Design Negligence Case, 10 FOR THEDFENSE No. 5 (May, 1969). Compliance
with the "state of the art" is not conclusive of due care. For this reason the trial
court's instructions may well amount to reversible error.
64Text at note 32 supra.
65While the exact content and detail of this warning has not as yet been determined, it would not place an undue burden on the manufacturer to develop a reasonably concise summary of safety design variations of a given model. For a general
discussion of the duty to warn of a product-connected danger, see 1 R. HuRscir, supra

note 7, at §§ 2:28-2:57.

6 Unless the industry were to undertake blanket warnings to the general public
of safety design differences among their various models, their warnings to the initial
purchaser should not absolve them of liability to injured passengers or secondary
buyers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, comment n at 307-08 (1965).

312

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.118:299

CONCLUSION

In the past, the automobile industry has avoided liability for negligent design of automobiles which led to second accident injuries. However, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Larsen " marks the beginning of
a new trend of decisions. The court there properly stated the negligence
issue, holding the industry to a duty to design cars which do not create
an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision. This duty should be
measured by the estimate by design experts of the safety features the
industry can produce, and by the practicability of these features.
Courts can, as Mickle and Dyson demonstrate, play an important
role in the development of the standards by which this duty will be
measured. Although imprecise language in Dyson could be read otherwise, manufacturers should be held to a duty to make every model as
reasonably safe as possible, and a concurrent duty to forewarn consumers about the degree to which a specific model varies from the safest
model. Such an interpretation will provide adequate safeguards for
both the consumer and the industry as a whole.
67At the remanded trial of Larsen, General Motors argued to the jury that (1)
the Corvair's steering assembly conformed to the state of the art in 1963 and was used
in other popular models; (2) the plaintiff failed to establish that his injuries were
increased by the rearward displacement of the steering column; and (3) plaintiff's
failure to wear seat belts contributed to his injury to such extent that it barred
recovery in whole or in part. After three weeks of trial and several hours of jury
deliberation (in the courtroom because the jury room was too small to hold all of
the General Motors exhibits) the jury returned a unanimous verdict for the defendant.
Bowman, Defense of an Auto Design Negligence Case, supra note 63.

